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This very second, a battle between robots and pirates is being waged online.  
Pirates are stealing content from copyright holders and uploading it to various 
websites.  Robots are crawling the Web, searching for pirated content.  When a 
robot encounters pirated content, it is programmed to attack—either by reporting 
back to the copyright holder, or by going straight to the source and requesting that 
the material be removed.  Sometimes the pirates fight back, re-posting the content 
online soon after it is taken down or posting newly infringing content.  The cycle 
continues, and the battle rages on.1 
Generally speaking, “robots” like the one described above operate in a certain 
sequence.2  First, they scan the Internet for certain keywords or other indicia of 
copyrighted content.  Once the robot locates content it has identified as 
copyrighted, it informs the copyright holder, who then decides how to react.  The 
copyright holder may investigate the lead further, and, if the content is indeed 
found to be infringing, may send a request to the Internet service provider (“ISP”) 
to remove the infringing content.  This action is known as a “takedown” or “notice-
and-takedown” request. 
The robot, however, can also initiate what is known as a “robo-takedown” by 
contacting the host site directly and requesting that the content be removed.3  By 
definition, robo-takedown requests are issued pursuant to a largely—if not fully—
 
 1. This particular phenomenon, referred to as the “whack-a-mole problem,” will be explored in 
greater detail in Part I.B(1). 
 2. The term “robot” will be used throughout this Note to refer to search algorithms employed to 
scan the Web for specific indicia of infringing activity. 
 3. A variety of other terms are also used to describe the same process, including “automated 
takedown.”  See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Pinterest and Copyright’s Safe Harbors for Internet 
Providers, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 421 (2014). 
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automated review process, meaning that there is no human actor reviewing the 
content to verify that it is in fact copyrighted before requesting that it be removed.4  
Since each takedown request can identify an infinite number of sources pointing to 
content the algorithm has identified as infringing, this process can sometimes target 
content that is, in fact, noninfringing.5 
The intention behind robo-takedown regimes is to combat rampant online 
piracy, which, while difficult to quantify with exactitude, has been estimated to cost 
copyright holders billions of dollars annually.6  The U.S. Copyright Office recently 
noted: “the volume of infringing material accessed via the internet more than 
doubled from 2010 to 2012, and . . . nearly one-quarter of all internet bandwidth in 
North America, Europe, and Asia is devoted to hosting, sharing, and acquiring 
infringing material.”7 
Pirating is also a lucrative endeavor; a 2014 study sponsored by the Digital 
Citizens Alliance found that websites featuring pirated content rake in over $200 
million annually from advertising revenue and that profit margins on these sites can 
range anywhere from 80 to 94 percent.8 
Despite the fact that robo-takedown regimes are employed to combat online 
piracy, the literature and popular media attention surrounding takedown regimes 
frequently refer to the “abusive” nature of such practices.9  With the proliferation of 
 
 4. It should be noted that copyright holders and ISPs alike do not readily disclose the extent to 
which their processes are automated.  For the sake of this Note, the term “robo-takedown” will refer to 
processes that result in the removal of content online where there is no human actor on either the 
copyright holder or ISP end verifying that the content is, in fact, infringing.  The author makes no claim 
as to the prevalence of such processes. 
 5. The term “noninfringing” will be used throughout this Note to refer to content that is 
uncopyrightable, not copyrighted (e.g., the copyright term has expired), subject to a copyright exception 
like fair use, or otherwise outside the ambit of federal copyright protection.  No attempt will be made to 
distinguish between these different types of content. 
 6. See, e.g., Carl Bialik, Putting a Price Tag on Film Piracy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2013, 11:42 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/putting-a-price-tag-on-film-piracy-1228/ [https://perma.cc/ZC33-
EFFH] (comparing studies that found annual losses of between $6.1 billion and $20.5 billion); see also 
Dirs. Guild of Am., Piracy by the Numbers, DGA Q. (2010), https://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-
Articles/1001-Spring-2010/Internet-Issues-Piracy-Statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z98S-6LRX] 
(reporting that global piracy costs U.S. companies $25 billion in lost sales). 
 7. Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed Reg. 81862-01 (Dec. 31, 
2015). 
 8. Digital Citizens Alliance, Good Money Gone Bad: Digital Thieves and the Hijacking of the 
Online Ad Business (Feb. 2014), https://media.gractions.com/
314a5a5a9abbbbc5e3bd824cf47c46ef4b9d3a76/4af7db7f-03e7-49cb-aeb8-ad0671a4e1c7.pdf [https://
perma.cc/67BC-ASKQ]. 
 9. See, e.g., Grant Gross, What’s the problem with DMCA takedown notices?, PCWORLD (Mar. 
20, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2110520/whats-the-problem-with-dmca-takedown-
notices.html [https://perma.cc/2BKU-GSZP] (“Any multistakeholder dialog that was talking about the 
notice-and-takedown system and trying to improve it that didn’t include a discussion of takedown abuse 
would really have no legitimacy in the eyes of many, many Internet users.”); Mike Masnick, If We’re 
Going to Change DMCA’s ‘Notice & Takedown,’ Let’s Focus on How Widely It’s Abused, TECHDIRT 
(Mar. 14, 2014, 1:36 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140314/11350426579/if-were-going-to-
change-dmcas-notice-takedown-lets-focus-how-widely-its-abused.shtml [https://perma.cc/GA95-
LZK2]; Mitch Stoltz, In Hotfile Docs, Warner Hid References to ‘Robots’ And Its Deliberate Abuse of 
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user-generated content (“UGC”)10 made possible by sites such as YouTube, 
algorithms have the potential to detect content uploaded not just by seasoned 
pirates but also by those who have no intention of pirating copyrighted content.  
And, because of the high volume of takedown requests ISPs receive11 and the speed 
with which they are required to respond,12 takedown requests sometimes result in 
the removal of noninfringing content.13  Thus, while it is efficient for copyright 
holders to move toward automated processes—and many of them are14—it is also 
easier for observers to paint such practices as abusive when noninfringing content 
is removed as a result of a robo-takedown request. 
However, the term “abuse” as it pertains to takedown regimes has never been 
adequately defined.  Surely some of the content targeted by takedown requests is 
actually infringing, and thus robo-takedowns, at least in part, achieve the goal of 
protecting copyright holders by keeping pirated content off the Web.  However, it 
is also clear that at least in some instances, robo-takedown requests have a chilling 
effect on free speech by preemptively removing content that does not violate 
 
Takedowns, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/hotfile-
docs-warner-hid-references-robots-and-its-deliberate-abuse-takedowns [https://perma.cc/9Z2D-WEVL]; 
Jamie Williams, Absurd Automated Notices Illustrate Abuse of DMCA Takedown Process, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/absurd-automated-notices-
illustrate-abuse-dmca-takedown-process [https://perma.cc/97FJ-2AYW]. 
 10. “UGC sites rely on their users to contribute content.  Blogs, wikis, social-networking sites, 
and video-sharing sites (e.g., YouTube) are among the most popular UGC technologies.”  Michael S. 
Sawyer, Note, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 363 (2009). 
 11. “Google, which as a provider of ‘information location tools’ under the DMCA may receive 
more takedown requests than any other entity, reports that the number of such requests it receives for 
Google Search on a weekly basis has climbed into the millions.”  INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 57 (2013) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER].  There is also evidence that 
the volume of takedown requests has been increasing year after year.  For example, the number of links 
Google was asked to remove from its search engine in 2014 was a 75% increase from the number of 
links it was asked to remove the year before.  Ernesto Van der Sar, Google Asked to Remove 345 Million 
‘Pirate’ Links in 2014, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 5, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/google-asked-remove-
345-million-pirate-links-2014-150105/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter [https://perma.cc/
WH2E-K4K4]. 
 12. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2010).  This provision of the DMCA will be explored in 
more depth in section I.A of this Note. 
 13. For example, Google’s reported compliance with takedown requests for Search is around 
97%.  Google, Google Transparency Report, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
copyright/faq/ [https://perma.cc/6CMV-3FHM] (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).  Note, however, that 
information regarding the rate with which ISPs comply with takedown requests, the number of requests 
they receive, and the process by which they comply with such requests is not readily available. 
 14. “Because the large amount of infringing content on the Internet makes individual review of 
each item infeasible, large right holder organizations find it necessary to use automation.”  COPYRIGHT 
GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 57; see also Matthew Schonauer, Note, Let the Babies Dance: 
Strengthening Fair Use and Stifling Abuse in DMCA Notice-and-takedown Procedures, 7 I/S: J. L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 135, 156 (2011) (“Increasingly, copyright owners look to automate solutions to 
the demanding task of policing the Internet for infringing uses of their works.”). 
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anyone’s copyright.15  While some are inclined to find takedown processes abusive 
by their very nature, particularly with regard to robo-takedowns,16 others argue that 
there is only a certain point at which they become so.17  Adding to the confusion, 
there is no definitive data on how much of the content that is removed pursuant to 
robo-takedown requests is actually infringing and the portion of that content that is 
noninfringing.  Some sources suggest that the amount of noninfringing content that 
is removed is “miniscule” compared to the amount of infringing content that is 
targeted—a suggestion, perhaps, that the notice-and-takedown system is largely 
effective.18  So when, exactly, does a robo-takedown regime move away from its 
goal of thwarting copyright infringement and become abusive? 
This Note argues that automated notice-and-takedown processes are in fact the 
most efficient means available to deal with the high volume of infringing content in 
the digital world, but that the counter-notification procedure needs to be 
strengthened to provide more protection to noninfringing users in the event that 
their content is removed.  Further, the process of scanning for and identifying 
infringing content must be improved to lessen the incidence of overbroad requests.  
Part I of this Note provides background on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) and the evolution of the notice-and-takedown procedure.  Part II 
outlines the problems with the current state of the notice-and-takedown 
environment, provides an overview of the data available on takedown requests, and 
presents an empirical analysis of all known litigation arising from user pushback19 
on such requests in an attempt to shed new light on the amount of noninfringing 
content that is actually targeted.  The overarching aim of Part II is to help answer 
the question of whether takedown requests, generally speaking—but with an 
emphasis on robo-takedown requests—tend to be abusive in practice, or if 
instances of overbroad requests are the exception rather than the norm.  Finally, 
Part III suggests ways in which automated notice-and-takedown processes can be 




 15. See, e.g., Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling 
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown Regime by Taking 
Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747 (2011); Schonauer, supra note 
14, at 156; Williams, supra note 9 (“Sending automated notices, without human review, is itself an 
abuse of the DMCA takedown process.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Cattleya M. Concepcion, Note, Beyond the Lens of Lenz:  Looking to Protect Fair 
Use During the Safe Harbor Process Under the DMCA, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 219, 232 (2010) 
(arguing that takedown regimes become abusive when used to suppress fair use). 
 18. Gross, supra note 9 (“[W]hen you look at the number of incorrect or abusive notices in 
perspective, it’s actually a miniscule percentage of the total.”). 
 19. The term “user pushback” will be used throughout this Note to refer to the general process of 
disputing takedown requests.  This can include either counter-notification under 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) 
or litigation. 
CARPOU, ROBOTS, PIRATES, AND THE RISE OF THE AUTOMATED TAKEDOWN REGIME, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 551 (2016)  
556 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:4 
 
I.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT CASE LAW ON 
ROBO-TAKEDOWNS 
A.  HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
1.  Overview 
In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) enacted a 
Copyright Treaty, the terms of which apply to all signatory nations, including the 
United States.20  Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to comply with WIPO and 
to bring the Copyright Act into the digital age.21  According to the statute’s 
legislative history, Congress had two goals in creating the DMCA:  “the protection 
of intellectual property and the promotion of the growth and development of 
electronic commerce.”22  These goals arose in part out of Congress’s concern about 
widespread piracy made possible by the rise of digital media.23 
The DMCA added several important features to the preexisting copyright law, 
including anti-circumvention measures and a statutory safe harbor for UGC sites.24  
This latter measure, codified in § 512 of the DMCA, was designed to protect ISPs 
from liability for copyright infringement for content uploaded on their sites by 
users so long as the ISPs implement a mechanism designed to remove infringing 
content.25  Section 512, thus, effectively struck a compromise between ISPs and 
copyright holders, leading to the rise of UGC sites such as YouTube and Twitter.26 
Since enactment of the DMCA in 1998, ISPs have been able to escape liability 
for infringing material posted by users by complying with a notice-and-takedown 
procedure, which requires that they remove content “expeditiously” from their sites 
after receipt of a proper takedown request from a copyright holder.27  By striking a 
balance between the needs of copyright holders to protect their intellectual property 
and the need for ISPs to escape liability in order to create innovative technologies, 
this statutory safe harbor has allowed UGC sites to proliferate and persist.28 
It should be briefly noted that some potential forms of online piracy fall outside 
of the notice-and-takedown structure altogether, specifically because there is no 
posted content to be taken down.  Illegal peer-to-peer file-sharing, for example, is 
 
 20. Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: 
Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 387, 387–88 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 388. 
 22. Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown/Put Back Provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 308 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
 23. Id. at 308. 
 24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2010). 
 25. Rebecca Alderfer Rock, Comment, Fair Use Analysis in DMCA Takedown Notices: 
Necessary or Noxious?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 691, 693 (2014). 
 26. Id. at 692. 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2010). 
 28. David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the Web, 
WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/8MR4-PBBU]. 
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an ongoing problem that involves piracy that occurs between individual users 
without any content being posted to the Web.29  New streaming technologies also 
allow for potential copyright violation that falls outside the ambit of the notice-and-
takedown structure.  These technologies allow users to stream content live without 
actually posting anything online that could be the subject of a takedown notice.30  
As these activities fall outside the scope and purpose of this Note they will not be 
explored further. 
2.  The Section 512(c) Takedown Procedure 
Section 512(c) of the DMCA allows ISPs to escape liability for copyright 
infringement if they comply with a notice-and-takedown procedure by removing 
allegedly infringing content from their sites in response to takedown requests 
issued by copyright holders.31  Section 512(c)(3)(A) provides six elements that a 
copyright holder must fulfill in order to effectuate a valid takedown request: 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the 
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if 
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, 
a representative list of such works at that site. 
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject 
of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, 
and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the 
material. 
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the 
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an 
electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. 
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the 
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law. 
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty 
of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.32 
Notably, § 512(c) requires only that the issuer of the takedown request have a 
 
 29. Robert Steele, If You Think Piracy is Decreasing, You Haven’t Looked at the Data. . . ., 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (July 16, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/07/16/if-you-think-
piracy-is-decreasing-you-havent-looked-at-the-data-2/ [https://perma.cc/C4W4-KPY4]. 
 30. See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, The future of online piracy is easy, free and already in your pocket, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/04/15/the-
future-of-online-piracy-is-easy-free-and-already-in-your-pocket/ [https://perma.cc/F9UY-5NHT]. 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010). 
 32. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi). 
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“good faith belief” that the targeted material is actually infringing.33  The lack of 
explanation in the statute for what constitutes a “good faith belief” has been the 
subject of much discussion and litigation.34 
3.  The Section 512(g) Counter-Notification Procedure 
Once a takedown request is issued, the ISP must “take[] reasonable steps 
promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the 
material[.]”35 
Section 512(g)(3) then provides a procedure by which users can push back on 
takedown requests to either prevent ISPs from taking their content down, or to have 
their content restored.36  The section details four steps a user must take to serve a 
counter-notification upon an ISP: 
(3) Contents of counter notification.—To be effective under this subsection, a counter 
notification must be a written communication provided to the service provider’s 
designated agent that includes substantially the following: 
(A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber. 
(B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been 
disabled and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or 
access to it was disabled. 
(C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief 
that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of 
the material to be removed or disabled. 
(D) The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the 
subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial district 
in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the United 
States, for any judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that 
the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided 
notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person.37 
The amorphous “good faith belief” standard appears again in this section, here 
as a requirement of the user.  What is more, the user must submit to the jurisdiction 
of the court for any ensuing litigation, a requirement that has no analogue in § 
512(c).38 
Once the ISP has received the counter-notification, it must notify the original 
issuer of the takedown notice and replace the content within ten to fourteen 
 
 33. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
 34. See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(discussed infra Part I.C.2). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
 36. Id. § 512(g)(3). 
 37. Id. § 512(g)(3)(A)–(D). 
 38. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C)–(D). 
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business days.39  Replacement of the content, however, is not required if the ISP 
first receives notice that the copyright holder has filed an action seeking an 
injunction against the user from engaging in allegedly infringing activity related to 
the contested content.40  Once a counter-notification is issued, the copyright holder, 
therefore, has the choice to either allow the content to go back up or to file an 
infringement action against the user.41 
B.  “ROBO-TAKEDOWN” DEFINED 
“Robo-takedowns” refer to the processes by which copyright holders send 
automated takedown requests to ISPs after employing algorithms to crawl the Web 
for indicia of potentially infringing material.42  These types of notices can be 
voluminous, sometimes requesting the takedown of hundreds or even thousands of 
instances of allegedly infringing content at a time. 
1.  The “Whack-a-Mole” Problem:  The Evolution of Robo-Takedowns in 
Response to High Volume Repeat Offenders 
Robo-takedowns are a fairly recent phenomenon.  They evolved in response to 
what has been described as the “whack-a-mole” problem:  once infringing content 
is removed, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that it “stays down.”43  The 
DMCA requires ISPs to implement reasonable policies to deal with repeat 
infringers, but it is often difficult if not impossible for ISPs to respond adequately 
to instances in which the same content reappears in high volume, either from the 
same infringer or from different infringers.  Because infringing content can 
essentially pop back up again right after being removed, the implementation of 
robo-takedown regimes has become an ever-increasing means of responding to the 
constant resurgence of infringing material.44 
2.  Standard for Determining “Abusive” Takedown Regimes 
Currently, there is no clear standard for determining when a takedown request or 
regime becomes “abusive.”  The term “abuse” as it pertains to takedown regimes is 
used frequently and amorphously, and the contours of the term have never been 
 
 39. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B)–(C). 
 40. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
 41. Rock, supra note 25, at 693. 
 42. See supra note 3. 
 43. “Rights holders report that they find themselves in a game of ‘whack-a-mole’—a never-
ending cycle of sending notices about infringing content that may be taken down, only to reappear a 
short time later in a new location on the same website.”  COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 
56. 
 44. Rock, supra note 25, at 694 (noting the “onerous” burden the DMCA places on copyright 
holders to “police the Internet” for instances of infringement while ISPs that are compliant with § 512(c) 
remain free from liability). 
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explicitly defined.45  For example, it can be applied categorically to any takedown 
resulting from the use of automated processes.46  The term can also arise any time a 
takedown request stifles speech or gives rise to the specter of censorship, even 
where such effect is not the goal of the copyright holder.47  Yet another application 
occurs where the issuer of the takedown request is not actually the holder of the 
copyright in question, or where the takedown notice targets noninfringing 
content.48  The most obvious example is where takedown notices are used as a 
“sword” rather than as a “shield,”49 including blatant attempts to censor criticism or 
stifle competition.50 
The closest the actual text of the DMCA gets to delineating a line at which a 
takedown regime becomes abusive is in § 512(f), which attempts to guard against 
“knowing material misrepresentations” in the issuance of takedown requests.51  
Indeed, in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., a case involving user pushback on a 
robo-takedown request, the court posited that “[t]he purpose of Section 512(f) [of 
the DMCA] is to prevent the abuse of takedown notices.”52 
Pursuant to § 512(f), if a copyright holder is found to have knowingly materially 
misrepresented the infringing nature of a targeted work, she can be held liable for 
pecuniary damages.  Conversely, a user who follows the counter-notification 
procedure and makes a “willful misrepresentation” as to the noninfringing nature of 
her work can also be liable for damages.53  The language of § 512(f) reads as 
follows: 
(f) Misrepresentations.—Any  person who knowingly materially misrepresents under 
this section— 
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or 
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, 
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the 
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s authorized licensee, or 
by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the 
service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access 
to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed 
 
 45. See, e.g., supra note 9. 
 46. See, e.g., supra note 16. 
 47. Cobia, supra note 20, at 392. 
 48. Id. at 391–92. 
 49. See Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204–05 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 50. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, If We’re Going to Change DMCA’s ‘Notice & Takedown,’ Let’s 
Focus On How Widely It’s Abused, TECHDIRT (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20140314/11350426579/if-were-going-to-change-dmcas-notice-takedown-lets-focus-how-widely-its-
abused.shtml [https://perma.cc/QF3U-P9JR]. 
 51. In fact, some commentators already associate takedown “abuse” with § 512(f).  See, e.g., 
COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 57. 
 52. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 53. See Shropshire v. Canning, No. 10-CV-01941, 2011 WL 90136 *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011). 
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material or ceasing to disable access to it.54 
The evolution of the § 512(f) standard, which is outlined in more detail below, 
provides some useful insight into how courts have viewed overreaching notice-and-
takedown practices.  The contours of what constitutes an abusive takedown 
practice, however, remain unclear. 
C.  EVOLUTION OF THE SECTION 512(F) MISREPRESENTATION STANDARD 
The § 512(f) standard has evolved over time in response to instances of user 
pushback on takedown requests, beginning with Online Policy Group v. Diebold.55  
While the standard today remains unclear in most circuits, the following cases 
provide insight into how courts have dealt with the use and misuse of the notice-
and-takedown procedure, which in turn could shed light on how courts will deal 
with litigation arising from robo-takedowns. 
1.  Diebold 
The first case involving a potential misuse of the notice-and-takedown system 
was Online Policy Group v. Diebold.56  A group of students at Swarthmore College 
sued Diebold, a manufacturer of electronic voting machines, for a declaratory 
judgment that they did not infringe Diebold’s copyright, and for injunctive relief 
arising from Diebold’s violation of § 512(f).57  Diebold’s voting machines had been 
the subject of public controversy since “the reliability and verification procedures 
of the machines [had] been called into question,” and several email exchanges had 
been leaked suggesting that employees knew about the machines’ deficiencies.58  
The plaintiffs posted the leaked emails online, and an online newspaper outlet 
published an article that criticized Diebold and linked to the emails posted by the 
plaintiffs.59  Diebold then sent DMCA takedown requests to the ISPs hosting the 
leaked emails “in an alleged effort to prevent further public viewing of the email 
archive.”60  Even though Diebold did not thereafter sue the plaintiffs for copyright 
infringement, the plaintiffs sued Diebold for violation of § 512(f) of the DMCA.61 
The case, which was decided in 2004, held that the copyright holder violated § 
512(f) by “knowingly materially misrepresent[ing]” that the plaintiffs had violated 
their copyright.62  In reaching this decision, the court emphasized that “[t]he fact 
that Diebold never actually brought suit against any alleged infringer suggests 
 
 54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(f)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 55. 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1198–99. 
 58. Id. at 1197. 
 59. Id. at 1197–98. 
 60. Id. at 1198. 
 61. Id. at 1199. 
 62. Id. at 1204. 
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strongly that Diebold sought to use the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions—which 
were designed to protect ISPs, not copyright holders—as a sword to suppress 
publication of embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its intellectual 
property.”63  Using a takedown request as a sword—that is, using it as an 
affirmative means of accomplishing a strategic end, rather than as a defensive 
measure to protect one’s copyright—is thus an impermissible use of the notice-and-
takedown structure and is actionable under § 512(f). 
Recognizing that this was a case of first impression, the court defined 
“knowingly materially misrepresents” as follows: 
A party is liable if it “knowingly” and “materially” misrepresents that copyright 
infringement has occurred.  “Knowingly” means that a party actually knew, should 
have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no 
substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making 
misrepresentations.  “Material” means that the misrepresentation affected the ISP’s 
response to a DMCA letter.64 
Here, because “[n]o reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the 
portions of the email archive discussing possible problems with Diebold’s voting 
machines” were an infringement of Diebold’s copyright under the circumstances, 
and because it was clear that Diebold knew that the takedown requests would result 
in online removal of the email content, Diebold was liable under § 512(f).65 
2.  Rossi 
Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America Inc. was decided just a few 
months after Diebold, and addressed the “good faith belief” requirement of § 
512(c) of the DMCA.66  Rossi reconciled the “good faith belief” standard of section 
512(c) with the “knowing misrepresentation” standard of § 512(f), finding that 
liability can only be imposed for a “knowing misrepresentation” under § 512(f).67 
In this case, the plaintiff was the owner and operator of a website that “provided 
visitors with a directory of websites containing information about movies.”68  A 
Motion Picture Association of American (“MPAA”) member alerted the MPAA to 
the plaintiff’s website, which the MPAA then examined and found to include text 
suggesting the availability of pirated film content.69  Even though the MPAA found 
content on the plaintiff’s website suggesting film piracy, “[i]t is undisputed that 
MPAA did not attempt to download any movies from [the plaintiff’s] website or 
 
 63. Id. at 1204–05. 
 64. Id. at 1204 (internal citations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 1204. 
 66. 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 67. Id. at 1004–05. 
 68. Id. at 1001–02. 
 69. “A subsequent examination of Rossi’s website revealed the following contents: ‘Join to 
download full length movies online now! new movies every month’; ‘Full Length Downloadable 
Movies’; and ‘NOW DOWNLOADABLE.’”  Id. at 1002. 
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any links to the site.”70  The MPAA sent a takedown request to the ISP hosting the 
plaintiff’s website, and within a few days, the plaintiff found a new ISP to host his 
website.71  The plaintiff sued the MPAA under several tort causes of action, 
asserting that the MPAA had not complied with § 512(c)’s “good faith belief” 
requirement in sending its takedown notices.72 
In finding for the MPAA, the court held that the “good faith belief” requirement 
in § 512(c) “encompasses a subjective, rather than objective, standard.”73  
Comparing the § 512(c) “good faith” standard with the “knowing 
misrepresentation” standard of § 512(f), the court held that “[a] copyright owner 
cannot be liable simple because an unknowing mistake is made,” but “[r]ather, 
there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on 
the part of the copyright owner.”74  The court found that the MPAA met this 
standard when it investigated the plaintiff’s website and found statements that 
suggested piracy of the MPAA’s copyrighted films.75 
3.  Lenz 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,76 decided in 2008 and affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit in 2015,77 applied the Diebold and Rossi standards of liability to a robo-
takedown request and further defined the contours of a § 512(f) claim.  In Lenz, an 
individual user posted a video of her son on YouTube in which the child danced to 
the artist Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy” which was playing audibly in the 
background.78  Universal Music, which owns the copyright to the song, sent a 
takedown request to YouTube demanding that the song be removed, after which 
YouTube removed the video from its site.79  Lenz followed the counter-notification 
procedure, and six weeks later, YouTube reinstated the video.80  Lenz then sued 
Universal for misuse of the takedown procedure under § 512(f).81 
The district court tackled the issue of whether Diebold and Rossi required a 
copyright holder to consider the possible applicability of fair use before sending a 
takedown request.82  The court held that “in order for a copyright owner to proceed 
under the DMCA with a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
 
 70. Id. at 1003. 
 71. Id. at 1002. 
 72. Id. at 1002–03. 
 73. Id. at 1004. 
 74. Id. at 1005 (emphasis added). 
 75. “As the district court noted, there is little question that these statements strongly suggest, if 
not expressly state, that movies were available for downloading from the site.”  Id. at 1005 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 76. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Lenz I”). 
 77. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Lenz II”). 
 78. Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52. 
 79. Id. at 1152. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1153. 
 82. Id. at 1154–55. 
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complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law, the 
owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright.”83  Thus, 
“[a]n allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown 
notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine . . . is sufficient to state 
a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”84  Applying 
Rossi, the court held that while a copyright owner must consider fair use as part of 
its initial review of a potential infringement, it need not conduct “a full 
investigation.”85 
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit opinion affirming the district court holding 
specifically mentioned the potential use of automated takedown processes, albeit in 
dicta.  The court stated:  “We note, without passing judgment, that the 
implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle 
ground for processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s 
requirements to somehow consider fair use.”86  Thus, the Ninth Circuit seemed to 
be adopting the view that the use of automated processes on its face does not 
violate § 512(f). 
II.  THE PROBLEMATIC NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN ENVIRONMENT 
OF TODAY 
A.  DEFINING THE “PROBLEM” OF ROBO-TAKEDOWNS 
This Note argues that robo-takedowns in and of themselves are not the 
problem—in fact, they are arguably the best means available for copyright holders 
to fight rampant piracy online, including the ever-present “whack-a-mole” 
problem.87  Automated processes could also be the most efficient way for ISPs to 
deal with the increasingly high volume of takedown requests they receive.88  But, 
with the rise of automated takedown regimes, there is an increased risk that robo-
takedown requests will result in the erroneous takedown of noninfringing content, 
 
 83. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(V)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1156. 
 86. Lenz II, 801 F.3d 1126, 1135.  The court went on to say that “consideration of fair use may be 
sufficient if copyright holders utilize computer programs that automatically identify for takedown 
notifications content where: ‘(1) the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work 
submitted by a content owner; (2) the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted 
work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is comprised of a single copyrighted work.’”  Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of the State 
of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 376 (2014) (“[T]he takedown process . . . is the 
mainstay of content providers for managing online infringement because it is fast, cheap, and 
efficient.”). 
 88. At least one federal judge agrees with this proposition.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 
No. 11-CV-07098-AB (SHx), 2015 WL 1746406, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (“[Defendant’s] 
automated system is essential to expeditiously processing takedown notices in light of the staggering 
volume of requests Giganews receives—in the year between November 6, 2012 and November 6, 2013, 
Giganews processed more than half-a-billion takedown notices.”). 
CARPOU, ROBOTS, PIRATES, AND THE RISE OF THE AUTOMATED TAKEDOWN REGIME, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 551 (2016)  
2016] ROBOTS, PIRATES, & THE RISE OF THE AUTOMATED TAKEDOWN REGIME 565 
 
resulting in a chilling effect on free speech.89  This is largely due to takedown 
requests that are overly broad—i.e., requests that, in an attempt to target 
legitimately infringing content, also target content that somehow appears to be 
infringing but in fact is not. 
Next, there appears to be a relatively low incidence of user pushback on 
takedown requests.90  This could mean two things:  either the user pushback 
mechanism is flawed and users do not push back when they actually have 
legitimate claims, or users are pushing back when they have legitimate claims and 
the incidence of overly broad requests is actually relatively low (meaning that robo-
takedown regimes are, in fact, operating effectively).  This Note does not attempt to 
fully answer the question of why there is a low incidence of user pushback on 
takedown requests, but rather aims to provide additional data that can hopefully be 
useful in this inquiry. 
1.  Overbroad Takedown Requests 
A potential response to the aforementioned “whack-a-mole” problem is to use 
automated processes to send frequent—and voluminous—requests to ISPs in the 
hope that a steady stream of takedown requests will target any infringing content 
that continues to reappear.  While copyright holders are generally hesitant to admit 
to this strategy, evidence suggests that ISPs are currently saddled with a steady 
stream of requests that is both increasing91 and high in volume.92  The ISPs 
themselves face limited resources and the ever-present risk of losing safe harbor 
protection if they fail to “expeditiously” remove content pursuant to takedown 
requests.93  This environment incentivizes the issuance of overbroad requests at the 
expense of individual users without much recourse for the copyright holders, thus 
creating a perfect storm for the chilling of free speech.94 
Determining the exact number or proportion of overbroad requests is currently 
impossible, as information regarding the number of takedown requests actually 
 
 89. See Seltzer, supra note 15. 
 90. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 91. Google reports that the number of requests they receive “has been increasing rapidly.”  Fred 
von Lohmann, Transparency for copyright removals in search, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (May 24, 
2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-in.html. 
 92. In 2014 alone, Google received requests for more than 345 million allegedly-infringing links.  
Ernesto Van der Sar, Google Asked to Remove 345 Million ‘Pirate’ Links in 2014, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 
5, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/google-asked-remove-345-million-pirate-links-2014-150105/
?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter [https://perma.cc/FD8U-ZFH6]. 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 94. “[T]he effect of the DMCA’s takedown provisions has been to allow the copyright owners to 
escape any burden.  The copyright owners send takedown notifications attesting good-faith belief, and 
the ISPs promptly remove the offending material.  If the Internet users sue, they must prove bad faith.”  
Benjamin Wilson, Comment, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard: How To Protect Internet 
Users from Bad-Faith Removal of Web Content, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 613, 636 (2010) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Seltzer, supra note 15, at 178 (arguing that “the DMCA is systematically 
susceptible to abusive claims”). 
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issued is limited. 
But, there is at least some evidence of overbroad robo-takedown requests.  In 
2012, Google reported that they refused to comply with around 3% of the DMCA 
takedown requests they received for Google Search, at least some of which were 
overbroad.95  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) went further, sifting 
through the data in Google’s 2012 Transparency Report and finding additional 
instances of seemingly overbroad takedown requests.96  The EFF also created an 
online “Hall of Shame” to highlight instances of “particularly bogus takedowns” 
based on anecdotal evidence from people who claim to have received takedown 
notices from a variety of ISPs.97  Website TorrentFreak also highlights overbroad 
requests on its site each week, using data from a DMCA takedown clearing 
house.98  Thus, even though the data on overbroad takedown requests is not fully 
determinative, there is at least some evidence to suggest that overbroad requests do 
occur and result in the takedown of noninfringing content. 
2.  Lack of User Pushback 
Based on studies conducted by Congress and the Center for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property, as well as self-reported anecdotal evidence compiled by 
copyright holders and Internet watchdogs alike, there appears to be a very low 
incidence of user pushback generally.99  Assuming this to be true, the reason for the 
low pushback remains unclear.  A lack of user pushback could mean a lot of things, 
including that the counter-notification procedure may be too arduous or 
intimidating for users to pursue.100  Indeed, § 512(g)’s requirement that users 
 
 95. See, e.g., Google, Google Transparency Report FAQ, https://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#compliance_rate [https://perma.cc/4LKJ-2R9P] (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2015). 
 96. Parker Higgins & Kurt Opsahl, Top 10 Takedowns in Google’s Copyright Transparency 
Report, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/top-10-
takedowns-googles-copyright-transparency-report [https://perma.cc/UQ6F-FRL9]. 
 97. ‘Hall of Shame’ Calls Out Bogus Internet Censorship, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 27, 
2009), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/10/27 [https://perma.cc/EPY2-FPXQ]. 
 98. See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, MPAA Targets Reddit Community Over Movie Piracy, 
TORRENTFREAK (June 24, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-targets-reddit-movie-piracy-140624/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RGF-UPSG]. 
 99. See, e.g., Section 512 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 59 (2014) (statement of Paul 
Sieminski, General Counsel for Automattic Inc.) [hereinafter Hearing]; Bruce Boyden, The Failure of 
the DMCA Notice and Takedown System: A Twentieth Century Solution to a Twenty-First Century 
Problem, CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bruce-Boyden-The-Failure-of-the-DMCA-Notice-and-Takedown-
System1.pdf; Motion Picture Association of America, Comments on Department of Commerce Green 
Paper, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, No. 130927852-3852-01, at 
4 (Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
motion_picture_association_of_america_comments.pdf (stating that the MPAA received eight counter-
notifications for a period of a few months in 2013). 
 100. This is especially likely considering the DMCA’s requirement that the user submit to the 
court’s jurisdiction to employ the counter-notification procedure.  See supra Part I.A.3. 
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submit to the jurisdiction of the courts before they can counter-notify has resulted 
in at least some instances in which users provide false information in their counter-
notification.101  The expense of litigating a suit could also deter users from seeking 
relief from the courts, even where the user believes she has a strong case.102  
Further, users could simply be confused about the recourse options available to 
them.103  Conversely, the lack of user pushback could mean that much of the 
content removed pursuant to takedown requests is, in fact, infringing.104 
While the reason for lack of user pushback is unclear, there is a structural aspect 
of the notice-and-takedown system that provides cause for concern.  In the non-
digital world, when an individual receives a cease and desist letter for a non-digital 
work (a painting, for example) alleging that the work infringes someone’s 
copyright, the individual is able to contest the letter while her work remains 
undisturbed.  In the digital world, by contrast, takedown requests result in the 
removal of content as a first step, with any dispute over the fact of infringement 
occurring later.105  This creates the potential for chilling effects on free speech in 
the digital world only, with the notice-and-takedown mechanism serving as a form 
of preemptive censorship.  As a purely structural matter, therefore, the need for a 
strong user-notification procedure is imperative. 
B.  DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Only a few empirical studies have been conducted thus far that thoroughly parse 
the data currently available on takedown requests.  While no one study provides a 
fully comprehensive snapshot of the takedown environment today, each provides 
valuable insight into the nature of the requests being issued. 
 
 101. See, e.g., Crunchyroll, Inc. v. Pledge, C 11-2334 SBA, 2014 WL 1347492, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 31, 2014). 
 102. Oftentimes, an individual user with limited resources would be going up against a large 
company with the vast resources to effectively litigate a case, which makes it even more unlikely that 
the user would choose to sue.  See Hearing, supra note 99, at 64 (statement of Mr. Paul Sieminski, 
General Counsel for Automattic Inc.). 
 103. For example, information posted by ISPs about their counter-notification procedure does not 
always answer all of a user’s questions, and different ISPs have varying policies as to how they treat 
counter-notifications.  See Parker Higgins, Corynne McSherry, & Daniel Nazer, Who Has Your Back? 
Protecting Your Speech from Copyright & Trademark Bullies, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 7–8 (2014), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/10/27/who-has-your-back-2014-copyright-trademark_0.pdf (“For 
example, while Pinterest’s terms outline a counter-notice procedure, they do not commit to restoring 
content if the person who filed the original complaint does not file a lawsuit.  Similarly, Tumblr only 
says it ‘may restore’ counter-noticed works.  By contrast, Facebook’s policy clearly provides the 
necessary information.”). 
 104. A low incidence of user pushback could simply mean that § 512 is working as intended.  See, 
e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices 
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH 
L.J. 621, 631 (2006) (“[T]he vast majority of 512 notices likely are never subject to the scrutiny of a 
court.  In part, this was precisely the point behind 512: the efficient removal of infringing materials from 
the Internet in a fair process, with (in most cases) no need for court review.”). 
 105. See supra notes 91–98. 
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It is important to note upfront some of the limiting factors affecting any analysis 
of the data currently available on takedown requests and counter notifications, 
including the findings presented in section II.C. of this Note.  First and perhaps 
most importantly, the data currently available is incomplete and thus it is 
impossible for any analysis to be fully comprehensive.  The major ISPs do not 
currently release all possible data related to the takedown requests or counter-
notifications they receive, nor are they required to do so by the DMCA.106  Second, 
since the DMCA does not include a reporting requirement, all data collected by any 
organization of its own volition is subject to potential institutional biases and 
should be regarded with the appropriate amount of caution. 
Many ISPs began releasing data only after Google released its first 
Transparency Report in 2009, and much of this data is limited.107  Google, for 
example, only releases data about a few of its products, and only after a certain 
date.108  YouTube employs a Content ID system that falls outside the ambit of § 
512 and accounts for the majority of takedown requests YouTube receives.109  This 
limits all analysis of takedown requests received by Google to Google’s non-
YouTube § 512(c) UGC websites, like Blogger and Google Play, and amplifies the 
proportion of requests received pursuant to § 512(d), which reflects information 
location tools like Google Search.  This is a major limiting factor, as it does not 
account for the proportion of the notice-and-takedown landscape that is 
undoubtedly dominated by YouTube. 
Aside from ISPs, a few notable organizations have been trying to compile data 
on takedowns and counter-notifications.  Harvard Law School started an online 
repository of such self-reported requests, Chilling Effects—since renamed 
Lumen110—which was and continues to be perhaps the largest repository currently 
available.111  Chilling Effects and Lumen have proven to be a valuable resource for 
researchers, and several ISPs, including Google and Twitter, automatically send 
 
 106. See Seng, supra note 87, at 378. 
 107. See Betsey Isaacson, 55 Charts That Prove Governments Are Increasingly Censoring Your 
Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/
government-censor-internet_n_3535322.html [https://perma.cc/SHM8-YJSW]. 
 108. In particular, Google did not start releasing information regarding DMCA takedown requests 
until 2012.  See GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG, supra note 91. 
 109. Seng, supra note 87, at 386. 
 110. The Chilling Effects website now now redirects to the Lumen site.  See CHILLING EFFECTS, 
https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); About Us, LUMEN, https://
lumendatabase.org/pages/about [https://perma.cc/S2GA-CQUG] (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  Lumen’s 
blog describes the creation of the Lumen site, and the migration of the Chilling Effects database to the 
new site, as resulting from the “astonishing growth” of the Chilling Effects database; Lumen reports that 
in October 2015, Chilling Effects received its one billionth allegedly-infringing URL.  Blog, LUMEN 
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://lumendatabase.org/blog_entries/763 [https://perma.cc/33CL-DA9C]. 
 111. Due to pressure from copyright holders unhappy with Chilling Effects’ collection of non-
linked infringing websites, Chilling Effects decided to remove its site from major search engines in 
January 2015.  Ernesto Van der Sar, Chilling Effects DMCA Archive Sensors Itself, TORRENTFREAK 
(Jan. 10, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/chilling-effects-dmca-archive-censors-itself-150110/ [https://
perma.cc/M3QA-QBX9]. 
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takedown notices to its repository.112  The EFF also collects self-reported takedown 
data, though not in as comprehensive a fashion as Chilling Effects or Lumen. 
1.  Urban and Quilter Study 
A seminal study conducted in 2006 by Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter marked 
the first time researchers attempted to compile empirical data on takedown regimes 
and it remains a valuable resource today in tracking the evolution of the notice-and-
takedown system over time.113  The researchers used a coding procedure to analyze 
nearly 900 takedown requests collected from a variety of sources, including those 
that had been submitted to Google and Chilling Effects, in an attempt to ascertain 
the number of takedown requests that result in the removal of legitimate, 
noninfringing content.114  The study found that while corporate entities sent the 
majority of § 512(c) takedown requests,115 requests sent by the movie and music 
industries only comprised 6% of the total requests issued.116  Together, the 
Recording Industry of America (“RIAA”) and the MPAA sent only nine notices 
under §§ 512(c) and 512(d).117  Even more surprisingly, the data revealed that 41% 
of all requests submitted to Google targeted “competitors of the complainants,” 
while 21% of §§ 512(c) and 512(d) notices sent to Google “target[ed] hobbyists, 
critics and educational users.”118  Next, turning to the content of the takedown 
requests themselves, the researchers concluded that a shocking 31% of §§ 512(c) 
and 512(d) notices raised issues “related to the underlying copyright claim, 
including fair use defenses, other substantive defenses, very thin copyright, or non-
copyrightable subject matter.”119  As to the incidence of counter-notification, the 
study found only seven counter-notices in the entire dataset.120  It is important to 
note, however, that this small number could be due to the relatively low incidence 
of § 512(c) notices at the time, because only § 512(c) obligates ISPs to inform 
takedown recipients of the counter-notification procedure.  Lastly, the study also 
concluded that § 512(c) notices were on the rise, even back in 2006.121 
This study provides meaningful insight into the way takedown requests are used, 
but is limited in a number of ways.  As an initial matter, the study was conducted 
before the rise in popularity of such UGC sites as YouTube and Twitter, and thus 
the majority of the takedown requests studied were actually submitted pursuant to § 
512(d) and not § 512(c).122  We can thus expect that a study conducted today using 
 
 112. Seng, supra note 87, at 381–82, n.37 and n.43. 
 113. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104. 
 114. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 623. 
 115. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 649–50. 
 116. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 651. 
 117. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 655. 
 118. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 655. 
 119. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 667. 
 120. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 679. 
 121. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 645–46. 
 122. In fact, only 315 § 512(c) notices, and sixty-eight “§ 512(c)-like notices,” were available for 
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a similar methodology might lead to much different results.123  Next, the sample 
size is relatively small—in 2006, not many takedown requests were issued at all 
and robo-takedown regimes had not yet become prevalent—and Google notices 
comprised a large majority of the data set.124  Lastly, the industry-specific results 
no longer seem to be entirely relevant; today, the entertainment industries 
overwhelmingly send the most takedown requests according to Google’s Copyright 
Transparency Report.125 
2.  Seng Study 
A more recent study conducted by Daniel Seng provides additional and 
fascinating insight into the state of takedown regimes today, including the rise of 
robo-takedown regimes in particular.126  Similar to the Urban and Quilter study, 
this study performs an empirical analysis of the notice-and-takedown landscape 
using data from the Chilling Effects repository.  In contrast to the Urban and 
Quilter study, however, the Seng study does not attempt to analyze the content of 
the requests themselves, but rather tracks the number of requests issued and 
analyzes the quantitative data in various ways.127 
Amazingly, Seng analyzed half-a-million takedown notices and over 50 million 
takedown requests in total,128 beginning with those first submitted to Chilling 
Effects and ending with those submitted December 31, 2012.129  In order to tackle 
the vast amount of data contained within the half-a-million takedown notices, Seng 
developed algorithms to parse the data and extracted thirty-six fields, resulting in 
over 50 million individual requests.130  Seng then analyzed these two datasets 
independently, drawing a variety of interesting and illuminating conclusions.  First, 
as to the identity of the copyright holders sending takedown requests, Seng found 
that the top twenty most frequent issuers of takedown notices comprise companies 
and organizations from the music, movie, adult entertainment, book, and software 
 
study.  Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 644. 
 123. For example, the Takedown Project, discussed infra Part II.B.3, promises to yield fascinating 
results. 
 124. Urban & Quilter, supra note 104, at 642. 
 125. GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
copyright/owners/?r=all-time [https://perma.cc/WJ7T-QNSN] (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 126. Seng, supra note 87. 
 127. Among the questions the Seng study seeks to answer:  “Who are the copyright owners that 
use takedown notices?  Who are the reporters serving the takedown notices on service providers?  Are 
there different types of reporters?  Who are the intermediaries who, as service providers, are served with 
the notices?  Are there different types of notices?  And which safe harbor provisions in the DMCA are 
addressed in these takedown notices and requests?”  Seng, supra note 87, at 376. 
 128. Seng distinguished between takedown notices and takedown requests in his study.  As defined 
in the study, a “notice” is the document that the copyright holder sends to the ISP requesting takedown 
of allegedly infringing material, and a “request” is the individual identification of allegedly-infringing 
content.  Thus, a “notice” can contain several individual “requests.”  See Seng, supra note 87, at 375-76 
nn.18–19. 
 129. Seng, supra note 87, at 382. 
 130. Seng, supra note 87, at 381–82. 
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industries, with 68.1% sent by the music and movie industries alone.131  As to the 
incidence of counter-notification, Seng found that while no counter-notices were 
served between 2008 and 2010, they comprised 0.131% of all notices in 2011 and 
0.020% of all notices in 2012.132  In total, there were fifty-nine counter-notices 
issued pursuant to § 512(c) in 2011, and eighty-two in 2012.133  This data presents 
a significant increase from the seven counter-notices found by Urban and Quilter in 
2006, but still shows that counter-notifications represent a markedly low proportion 
of the total number of notices sent each year. 
Interestingly, Seng was able to analyze an automated removal procedure 
implemented by Google for which little public information is available.  Seng 
describes Google’s Trusted Copyright Removal Program (“TCRP”) as “an 
automated method for providers and agents to submit large numbers of notices and 
takedown requests electronically to Google, which Google would process rapidly 
via an automated process.”134  By searching the Chilling Effects repository for the 
electronic “Trusted User” signatures of TRCP participants, Seng was able to look at 
data that he believes is representative of the TRCP program.135  The data suggests 
that the participants are largely well known copyright holder companies, many of 
whom are also known to send high volumes of takedown notices, like the RIAA 
and BPI.136  The data also reveals that the program has resulted in Google’s receipt 
of 376 thousand notices and 54 million takedown requests, with an overall 
compliance rate of 96.2%.137  Even though not much is currently known about this 
program, and although it falls outside the ambit of § 512, it could potentially serve 
as an interesting model for creating more effective automated takedown procedures 
to combat piracy. 
The Seng study acknowledges a variety of limitations that are similar to those 
faced by the Urban and Quilter study.  For one, the data is limited to what is 
available through the Chilling Effects repository, and a large percentage of the 
requests are from Google.138  Secondly, because Google does not make data from 
its YouTube Content ID system publicly available through Chilling Effects or 
otherwise, the Seng study does not include any of this information in its analysis.139  
Google began reporting YouTube takedown requests in 2012, but that data is 
severely limited and likely not indicative of the volume of requests YouTube 
receives each year.  Thus, similar to the limitation encountered in the Urban and 
Quilter study, the Seng study is largely representative of takedown notices 
submitted pursuant to § 512(d) as opposed to § 512(c).  While this was not a 
 
 131. Seng, supra note 87, at 393–94. 
 132. Seng, supra note 87, at 462. 
 133. Seng, supra note 87, at 428. 
 134. Seng, supra note 87, at 414. 
 135. Seng, supra note 87, at 415. 
 136. Seng, supra note 87, at 457. 
 137. Seng, supra note 87, at 415–17. 
 138. Seng, supra note 87, at 384. 
 139. Seng, supra note 87, at 386–87. 
CARPOU, ROBOTS, PIRATES, AND THE RISE OF THE AUTOMATED TAKEDOWN REGIME, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 551 (2016)  
572 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:4 
 
particularly limiting factor in the Urban and Quilter study for the obvious reason 
that YouTube did not exist at the time the analysis was conducted, it does present a 
major limiting factor in the Seng study’s ability to provide a comprehensive 
snapshot of the takedown environment, as annual YouTube takedowns are believed 
to number in the millions.140  But, until Google makes this information publicly 
available, its absence will remain an unavoidable limitation for any current and 
future research. 
3.  The Takedown Project 
The Takedown Project, a collaboration between researchers from Berkeley Law 
School and the American Assembly at Columbia University, is currently 
performing studies that seek to expand upon the work conducted in the Urban and 
Quilter study with more recent data and a much broader data set.141  One of the 
projects, the Notice Coding Engine, utilizes both manual and machine coding to 
analyze the effect of automated processes on the notice-and-takedown procedure.142  
The other project, the Notice and Takedown Survey, will add to this information by 
conducting surveys of both large and small online service providers to learn about 
their experiences with and thoughts on the notice-and-takedown system.143  While 
the results from this project are forthcoming, it promises to provide valuable 
information on the notice-and-takedown landscape.144 
4.  The NYU Counter-Notification Study 
NYU School of Law’s Brennan Center for Justice issued a report in 2005 in 
which researchers followed up with the recipients of takedown notices “to learn 
 
 140. Seng, supra note 87, at 386-87. 
 141. TAKEDOWN PROJECT, http://takedownproject.org/projects [https://perma.cc/A6XJ-5XNH] 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. In 2015, one of the Takedown Project researchers gave a presentation at the 10th Annual 
European Policy for Intellectual Property Conference entitled, “Notice and Takedown in the Age of the 
Robo Notice.”  The abstract for the presentation describes the Takedown Project’s research inquiry as 
follows:  
The practice of notice and takedown under the DMCA has changed dramatically in the last five 
or six years, driven by the adoption of automated notice-sending systems.  As these systems 
became common, the number of takedown requests to many services skyrocketed, quickly 
overwhelming human vetting at the targeted services.  Increasingly, the online regulation of 
speech passes through such systems, subject to little human intervention or verification and a 
relatively poor record of accuracy.  Our work traces this history and evaluates the reliability of 
automated procedures, based on interviews with service providers and coding of Google Search 
notices. 
Joe Karaganis, EUROPEAN POLICY FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, http://
www.epip2015.org/notice-and-takedown-in-the-age-of-the-robo-notice/ [https://perma.cc/8GPG-8LEW] 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016).  The results of this research promise to be particularly pertinent to the 
subject of this Note.   
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how well fair use and free expression are faring among artists, scholars, and others 
who make critical contributions to culture and democratic discourse.”145  The 
researchers analyzed 320 cease and desist letters and takedown notices from 
Chilling Effects, conducted telephone interviews with seventeen recipients of 
takedown notices, and compiled the responses of 290 individuals who filled out an 
online survey about copyright and fair use.146  The study concluded that of the 
seventeen individuals interviewed on the telephone, five had “strong or at least 
reasonable fair use or First Amendment defenses,” “four had possible defenses,” 
and seven received notices “with weak copyright and trademark claims,” but nine 
of the seventeen “acquiesced in the copyright or trademark owners’ demands, or 
had their material removed because of take-down letters.”147 
C.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION ARISING FROM POTENTIAL MISUSE OF 
THE NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN PROCEDURE 
While there are many important studies analyzing the current notice-and-
takedown environment, there are currently no studies that look specifically at the 
litigation arising from possible misuses of the takedown procedure.  In order to 
attempt to fill this gap, this Note looks at the possibility of takedown abuse by 
attempting to identify and analyze all post-Diebold litigation arising from user 
pushback on takedown requests issued by copyright holders under § 512(c).148  
While an attempt was made to identify cases involving use of a robo-takedown, the 
research was not limited to cases arising from use of such requests.149 
I chose to focus on litigation rather than the data available on takedown requests 
or counter notifications themselves both because data regarding these requests is 
not readily available and because, of the data that is available, more resources than 
I have at my disposal would be required to parse through the data in a meaningful 
way.  Also, important analysis of this data is already currently underway and 
promises to yield interesting and illuminating results.150  My research also does not 
attempt to capture the incidence of counter-notification generally for similar 
reasons.  Further, by analyzing litigation as opposed to the takedown requests or 
counter notifications themselves, I was able to focus my research on the potential 
misuse of takedown requests issued pursuant to § 512(c) as opposed to § 512(d).  I 
felt that focusing on § 512(c) would be more representative of the overall state of 
notice-and-takedown practices, as much of the controversy regarding abuse of the 
 
 145. MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE 
SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL ii (2005). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
148.  Findings were intentionally limited to cases involving individual users and copyright holders 
to keep the research scope to a manageable size.  Instances of litigation arising from disputes between a 
copyright holder and an ISP, or a user and an ISP, were therefore excluded. 
 149. Indeed, it may even be impossible to distinguish the cases in such a way.  Since automated 
notice-and-takedown systems are relatively new, court opinions do not always identify them as such. 
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
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takedown procedure centers on content uploaded to UGC sites.  It is hoped that 
these findings, despite their limitations, may be useful in painting a picture of the 
larger notice-and-takedown landscape. 
1.  Limitations 
Some inherent limitations to these findings should be noted.  For one, even 
though the results that follow arise from extensive research using a variety of 
search parameters and both quantitative and qualitative data analysis, there is a 
possibility that some cases were simply missed in the research process.  This can be 
attributed to the inherent limitations of my research methodology, particularly since 
reliance on search parameters to identify relevant cases requires that courts actually 
use those terms in their opinions, and that the relevant cases are actually located. 
Next, the data’s usefulness in analyzing the effectiveness of the counter-
notification procedure—or the incidence of counter-notification generally—is 
limited.  It is often hard to tell in the text of the cases themselves when the counter-
notification procedure was or was not followed.  Thus, the data on the incidence of 
counter-notification below only reflects instances in which the counter-notification 
procedure was explicitly mentioned in the court opinion.  In the future, it would be 
helpful for courts to specifically mention use of the counter-notification procedure 
where it is employed so that research into this area can be more effective, 
comprehensive, and, ultimately, more useful. 
2.  Methodology 
The research was conducted using a variety of search parameters to identify 
relevant cases on Westlaw.151  Once relevant cases were identified, they were read 
to ensure relevancy and then relevant information from each case was compiled.  
This part of the research was initially completed on January 3, 2015 and then 
revisited in February 2016 in preparation for the publication of this Note. 
The cases were then broken down into categories based on the scenario in which 
the litigation arose.  The analysis revealed three key scenarios that seemed most 
relevant in identifying situations where there may have been misuse of the notice-
and-takedown procedure as between a user and a copyright holder.  In all instances, 
a copyright holder first sent a DMCA takedown request to an ISP pursuant to § 
512(c) requesting that the user’s allegedly infringing content be removed, and the 
user was notified of the takedown.  The categories were distinguished based on 
what followed. 
In “category one” cases, the user issued a § 512(g) counter-notification, and the 
copyright holder decided to pursue her copyright infringement claim anyway, or 
the user filed a declaratory action on the issue of copyright infringement.  The 
underlying claims were thus copyright infringement claims. 
 
 151. Complaints for which no opinion had yet been written were not included in the research. 
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In “category two” cases, the user issued a § 512(g) counter-notification, and the 
copyright holder decided not to pursue a copyright infringement claim, but the user 
thereafter decided to pursue a § 512(f) misrepresentation claim against the 
copyright holder.  The underlying claims were thus § 512(f) claims.  Category two 
also included situations in which the user did not issue a § 512(g) counter-
notification but still pursued a § 512(f) misrepresentation claim against the 
copyright holder after receiving notice of the takedown. 
Finally, in “category three” cases, one party asserted an infringement claim and 
the other asserted a § 512(f) claim.  Category three included claims both arising 
from § 512(g) counter-notification and those where counter-notification did not 
occur. 
3.  Findings 
In all, twenty-four cases were found, analyzed, and categorized.  Four cases 
were predicated on infringement claims (category one), sixteen were predicated on 
§ 512(f) claims (category two), and four involved both infringement and § 512(f) 
claims (category three). 
Figure 1. Year of Filing 
 
The data reveals that, overall, the rate of claims stemming from takedown 
requests involving counter-notifications or potential § 512(f) violations has been 
fairly low since Diebold.  It also shows that of all the types of cases that were 
studied, those involving § 512(f) claims where an underlying copyright dispute was 
not involved were the most prevalent, and those involving copyright infringement 
claims were the least prevalent.  Thus, the type of case that appeared most 
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subsequently filed a § 512(f) claim, and where the copyright holder did not pursue 
a copyright infringement claim against the user.  These cases included instances 
where the user employed the counter-notification procedure and where she did not, 
as well as cases where use of the counter-notification procedure was unclear.  
Notably, the incidence of these cases also appears to have remained the most stable 
over the time period examined.  From 2003 to 2014 there was a steady stream of 
category two § 512(f) cases, whereas the number of category one and category 
three cases—both of which involve copyright infringement claims—exhibited more 
of an ebb and flow pattern.   An interesting exception to the otherwise steady 
stream of § 512(f) cases is that there seems to have been a spike in the incidence of 
such cases in 2013.  While the data alone is inconclusive as to the cause of the 2013 
spike, it is possible that the upward trend will continue, particularly since two of 
the more recent cases studied both resulted in victories for the plaintiff.152 
Next, the scenario that occurred least frequently was that in which a takedown 
notice was issued and the copyright holder subsequently brought a copyright 
infringement claim.  This includes both category one and category three cases, and 
therefore encapsulates instances where counter-notification may or may not have 
occurred.       
Comparing the filing year findings to the Seng data, Seng found fifty-nine 
instances of counter-notifications arising from § 512(c) in 2011 and eighty-two in 
2012.153  Assuming the accuracy of all numbers under comparison, this would 
mean that in 2011, fifty-nine counter-notifications were issued, zero cases 
predicated on infringement alone were filed, one case predicated on § 512(f) was 
filed, and zero mixed infringement and § 512(f) cases were filed.  In 2012, eighty-
two counter-notifications were issued, zero infringement cases were filed, one § 
512(f) case was filed, and two mixed infringement and § 512(f) cases were filed.  
This comparison reveals that the incidence of litigation in all categories compared 
to the incidence of counter-notifications is markedly low.  While it’s impossible to 
draw conclusions from this comparison, it does seem to suggest that, where the user 
chose to counter-notify, the copyright holder was unlikely to sue the user for 
copyright infringement.  This could mean that the initial takedown requests in these 
scenarios were erroneous, or could simply mean that the copyright holder made a 
conscious decision not to pursue litigation for whatever reason.  The comparison 
also suggests that where the user chose to counter-notify, the user was then almost 
equally unlikely to file a § 512(f) claim against the copyright holder.  This could 
mean that the takedown requests in these scenarios were based on a good faith 
belief and the user recognized them as such, or that users in general do not yet fully 
understand their rights under § 512(f) and that an increase in future § 512(f) 
litigation is to be expected as the number of takedown requests—and, presumably, 
counter-notifications—increases.  
 
 152.  See infra notes 159-60. 
 153. Seng, supra note 87, at 427–28. 
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a. When a Copyright Holder Pursues an Infringement Claim (“Category One”) 
The table below demonstrates the number of pure copyright infringement claims 
arising from the counter-notification procedure.154  There were four cases total, one 
of which was a declaratory action brought by the user.  These cases were also fairly 
recent, with decisions reached in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and one case unresolved. 
 
with counter-
notification total # 
infringement claim fails 0 0 
infringement claim 
succeeds 3 3 
infringement claim 
unresolved 1 1 
 4 
 
Figure 2. Category One Findings 
 
One of the most interesting findings the research revealed was the incredibly 
low incidence of infringement claims occurring after a user’s counter-notification.  
This finding could demonstrate either that the notice-and-takedown system is 
working as intended, and that only users with colorable claims of noninfringement 
are counter-notifying; or, that the counter-notification procedure is underutilized, 
and that more users with colorable claims should feel empowered to counter-notify 
with the knowledge that not many of those counter-notifications give rise to 
litigation.  
Also, the data shows that in instances where an infringement claim is waged 
after a user’s counter-notification, but where the user does not counterclaim with a 
§ 512(f) claim (as in the category three cases), the infringement claim is more 
likely to succeed than it is to fail.  This suggests that once a user pushes back on a 
takedown request by counter-notifying, copyright holders will only pursue 
litigation if they believe they have a strong case of copyright infringement.  Where 
the copyright infringement case is weak, the copyright holder will not litigate the 
issue once a user pushes back.  This is a logical result, but also presents a stark 
contrast between the number of counter-notifications that researchers believe are 
issued each year, as evidenced by the Seng data,155 and the markedly low level of 
copyright infringement litigation that results from counter-notification, as 
 
 154. The cases were:  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); Schenck v. Orosz, 
No. 3:13-CV-0294, 2013 WL 5963557 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2013); Tetris Holding, LLC v. XIO 
Interactive, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 394 (D. N.J. 2012); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 155. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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evidenced by this research.  In order to issue a takedown request in the first place, a 
copyright holder must have a “good faith belief” that the material is infringing;156 
but if that’s the case, wouldn’t the copyright holder want to litigate the copyright 
infringement issue if the user pushes back?  While definitive conclusions cannot be 
drawn from the data, the findings indeed suggest that at least some of the takedown 
requests issued each year are based on copyright claims that the copyright holder 
would choose not to defend in court following a user’s counter-notification.   
b. When a User Asserts a Section 512(f) Misrepresentation Claim (“Category 
Two”) 
The table below shows the number of pure § 512(f) claims that were uncovered 







unclear total # 
512(f) claim fails 0 6 6 
512(f) claim succeeds 2 1 3 
512(f) claim 
unresolved 3 4 7 
 16 
 
Figure 3. Category Two Findings 
 
 
 156.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
 157. The cases were:  Handshoe v. Abel, No. 1:14-CV-159-KS-MTP, 2016 WL 110519 (S.D. 
Miss. Jan. 8, 2016); Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Curtis v. 
Shinsachi Pharm. Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Smith v. Summit Entm’t LLC, No. 3:11-
CV-348, 2011 WL 2200599 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 2011); Flynn v. Siren-BookStrand, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-
3160, 2013 WL 5315959 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2013); Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 333 (D. 
Mass. 2013); Ouellette v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. CV 10-133-M-DWM-JCL, 2012 WL 1435703 (D. 
Mont. Apr. 25, 2012); Does 1-4 v. Arnett, No. SACV 12-96-JST, 2012 WL 3150934 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 
2012); Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D. Md. 2011); Design 
Furnishings, Inc. v. Zen Path, LLC, No. CIV 2:10-2765, 2010 WL 5418893 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010); 
Brave New Films 501(c)(4) v. Weiner, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., No. C 07-03783, 2008 WL 962102 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008); Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996 
(N.D. Cal. 2008); Novotny v. Chapman, No. 3:05-cv-370, 2006 WL 2335598 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2006); 
Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005); Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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Notably, of the types of cases studied, pure § 512(f) claims far outnumbered 
those involving an underlying copyright infringement dispute.  Also, a total of five 
cases include specific reference to use of the counter-notification procedure, and of 
these cases, two resulted in success on a § 512(f) claim and three remain 
unresolved.  No case in which use of the counter-notification procedure was 
specifically mentioned in the court opinion resulted in a failed § 512(f) claim.   
Still, six of the sixteen cases resulted in a failed § 512(f) claim.  This could 
demonstrate the difficulty for a plaintiff to succeed on a § 512(f) theory, a 
phenomenon that has been documented and critiqued by researchers.158  
Interestingly, however, two of the three cases in which plaintiffs prevailed on a § 
512(f) theory occurred relatively recently—one in 2014,159 and one in 2015.160  
This category also revealed a surprising number of instances in which a § 512(f) 
claim was filed to prevent a copyright holder from issuing repeated takedown 
requests.161  This suggests at least a perceived inadequacy of the § 512(g) counter-
notification procedure to protect users from the threat of repeated takedown 
requests.  If the counter-notification procedure were enough to prevent copyright 
holders from submitting unsubstantiated takedown requests, there should be less § 
512(f) claims seeking such remedies as temporary restraining orders and 
injunctions, at least in theory.  Indeed, in one case involving two competitors, the 
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was denied because the court found that the 
counter-notification procedure was already an adequate means of “mitigat[ing] lost 
business.”162  Ironically, the DMCA is written to provide an extra layer of 
protection for copyright holders following counter-notification, guarding against 
the re-uploading of contested content if the copyright holder “has filed an action 
seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing 
activity.”163  Perhaps the statute could be amended to provide similar protection to 
users, who seem driven to litigation to, at least in part, address the threat of 
repeated takedown requests. 
Lastly, category two revealed a low incidence of § 512(f) claims arising from 
takedowns that were known or suspected to have resulted from automated 
processes.  A few of the cases, however, had facts suggesting that automated 
processes may have been involved, even if the court in those cases did not suggest 
as much.  One example is Curtis v. Shinsachi Pharmaceutical Inc., in which the 
plaintiff secured a default judgment against a defendant that had issued takedown 
 
 158. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 16, at 745–46 (“If taken seriously, the misrepresentation claim 
has the potential to shape the behavior of copyright owners who wield the powerful sword of the 
takedown notice.  To date, however, few misrepresentation claims have been brought, and the early 
interpretations of the provisions have limited their effectiveness in curbing abuse.”). 
159.  Curtis, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1190. 
160.  Automattic, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. 
161.  See, e.g., Flynn, 2013 WL 5315959 at *2; Design Furnishings, 2010 WL 5418893 at *3; 
Novotny, 2006 WL 2335598 at *1. 
162.  Curtis, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1204–05. 
163.  17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
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requests where no allegedly infringing content was even identified.164  One 
interesting § 512(f) case that explicitly references automated takedown procedures 
is Disney v. Hotfile, which involves an ISP (as opposed to a user) and is described 
in more detail below.165 
c. When a Party Asserts Infringement and the Other Asserts Section 512(f) 
(“Category Three”) 
The table below demonstrates the number of mixed infringement and § 512(f) 
cases that were discovered in the research.166  There were four total cases found; 
the table below divides the data by examining the outcomes of the infringement 












infringement claim fails 0 2 2 
infringement claim succeeds 0 1 1 
infringement claim 
unresolved 1 0 1 
512(f) claim fails 0 3 3 
512(f) claim succeeds 0 0 0 
512(f) claim unresolved 1 0 1 
 
8 
(4 cases overall) 
 
Figure 4. Category Three Findings 
 
Generally, these cases represent instances in which both parties believe they 
have colorable claims; although in one case, the same party asserted both 
 
164.  Curtis, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. 
165.  Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 
20, 2013). 
166.  The cases were: TD Bank v. Hill, Civ. No. 12-7188, 2015 WL 4523570 (D. N.J. July 27, 
2015); Shropshire v. Canning, No. 10-CV-01941, 2011 WL 90136 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 
2011); Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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infringement and § 512(f).167  In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
copyright infringement after the defendant had posted an allegedly infringing video 
on YouTube, and the plaintiff also sued under § 512(f), asserting that the defendant 
misrepresented that his content was noninfringing when he sent a § 512(g) counter-
notice to YouTube.168  While this case ultimately settled, it presents an interesting 
scenario in which an alleged infringer could be held liable both for copyright 
infringement and for § 512(f) misrepresentation. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly—and perhaps because the data set is so small—where 
both parties believe they have colorable claims, no conclusions can really be drawn 
as to the likelihood of success on the copyright infringement or § 512(f) claim.  The 
party asserting § 512(f) was markedly less likely to succeed in these cases than in 
category two cases, but that is a logical result because in category two cases, the 
copyright holder chose not to litigate the issue of copyright infringement at all.  
This suggests that category two cases perhaps represent scenarios in which the 
underlying takedown request was more likely to be erroneous than in category 
three cases, because in category three cases, the copyright holder at least believes 
that she has a valid claim of copyright infringement.  In theory, any copyright 
holder issuing a takedown notice should feel that she would have a colorable 
copyright infringement claim should the dispute reach litigation.  The fact that the 
copyright holders in category two cases did not bring infringement claims could 
help explain why users were more likely to achieve success on their § 512(f) claims 
in category two cases than in category three cases.  This perhaps suggests that 
where the copyright claim is weak, or where the connection between the 
copyrighted material and the allegedly-infringing material is tenuous, the takedown 
request is more likely to be illegitimate and the user’s § 512(f) claim is stronger as 
a result. 
d. A Case of Pushback on a Robo-Takedown Request 
In Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp.,169 five major film studios170 sued 
online storage locker Hotfile and its operator for direct and secondary copyright 
infringement.171  Hotfile then filed a counterclaim relating to 890 takedown 
requests submitted by the plaintiffs, alleging § 512(f) abuse of the notice-and-
takedown procedure.172  While this is a case of an ISP, not an individual user, 
pushing back on copyright holders, it presents very interesting legal questions 
because it specifically targets a robo-takedown regime. 
 
 167. See Shropshire, 2011 WL 90136. 
 168. Id. 
 169. 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Hotfile I”). 
 170. The five major studios included Disney, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, Columbia 
Pictures, and Warner Bros.  Id. at 1306. 
 171. Id. at 1307. 
 172. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 at *14 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 20, 2013) (“Hotfile II”). 
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In a 2013 order on various motions for summary judgment, the court found the 
defendants vicariously liable, but also held that the defendants could proceed on 
their § 512(f) counterclaim at trial.  In their counterclaim, the defendants asserted a 
willful blindness theory, “ask[ing] whether certain ‘egregious’ attributes of 
Warner’s system that might have prevented it from acquiring subjective 
knowledge . . . unjustly insulate Warner from liability for unreasonable 
mistakes.”173  Even though the defendants were not entitled to safe harbor 
protections because they “lacked any meaningful policy to combat 
infringement,”174 the court went one step beyond the defendants’ willful blindness 
theory and held that the defendants could still proceed to trial on their § 512(f) 
claim because “there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Warner 
intentionally targeted files it knew it had no right to remove.”175  The court seemed 
particularly concerned with the automated nature of Warner’s takedown practices, 
noting that although there was no known case “that actually address[es] the need 
for human review,” “Warner’s reliance on technology to accomplish the task might 
prevent it from forming any belief at all.”176  The court went on to quote from an 
amicus brief filed in Rossi, in which it was argued that “computers conducting 
automated searches cannot form a belief consistent with the language of the 
DMCA, because they cannot distinguish between infringing content and content 
that merely contains words that suggest infringement.”177 
Even more surprisingly, in September 2014, a federal judge ordered that Warner 
release previously sealed details of its robo-takedown regime pursuant to Hotfile’s 
counterclaim.178  The documents reveal the following about Warner’s robo-
takedown regime: 
Warner devotes the efforts of seven employees to online anti-piracy enforcement, 
hires third-party vendors, and, notably, uses the “common practice” of having 
“automated systems scan link sites and issue notifications of infringement to storage 
locker sites when infringing content is detected.”  This last practice is apparently the 
method by which the counterclaim files were selected for deletion and requires some 
explanation. 
In the automated review process, Warner’s employees first determine that a site is 
used for Internet piracy.  Then they manually create programmable instructions and 
material criteria for “robots”—software programs that use keywords to search for 
content based on attributes such as the file’s title, genre, and year of release.  The 
robots then, on their own, use search algorithms to spot URL links to infringing 
 
 173. Id. at *47. 
 174. Id. at *10. 
 175. Id. at *48. 
 176. Id. at *47.  Notably, in dicta, the Ninth Circuit has opined that automated processes on their 
face do not trigger § 512(f) concerns.  See Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1135. 
 177. Hotfile II, 2013 WL 6336286, at *47 (internal quotations omitted). 
 178. Mitch Stoltz, EFF Wins Release of Warner Bros. Documents on Robo-Takedown System, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/eff-wins-release-
warner-bros-documents [https://perma.cc/5VLA-L3NT]. 
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content.  The search instructions are refined based on how often they improperly 
detect non-Warner content that appears in the robots’ search results.179 
Not surprisingly, the details of Warner’s automated takedown process, including 
the use of the word “robots,” did not appear in the original, sealed version of the 
order.  While this case has since settled, the 2014 order opens the door for other 
judges to take a closer look at the robo-takedown regimes of copyright holders. 
III.  HARNESSING ROBOTS AS A FORCE FOR GOOD 
It is still unclear how effective robo-takedown regimes are at targeting 
infringing material, and how much of the content that is removed pursuant to such 
requests is actually infringing.  The litigation arising from user pushback on 
takedown requests generally suggests that perhaps the notice-and-takedown 
mechanism is working as planned; that is, fighting against piracy while minimizing 
the instances of erroneous takedowns.  What is certain, however, is that there is 
evidence of at least some noninfringing content that is erroneously removed 
pursuant to robo-takedown requests.180  Further, there is limited recourse for 
copyright holders that send overbroad requests, and thus little incentive for 
copyright holders to try to optimize their procedures in a way that limits the 
possibility of erroneous takedown requests.  In a world where the use of automated 
takedown procedures is on the rise, it is necessary to equip users with the tools they 
need to fight back against erroneous takedown requests. 
While robo-takedowns may be the best means available for dealing with 
rampant online piracy, copyright holders should at the very least be incentivized to 
make their procedures as optimal as possible.  Such incentives should seek to result 
in the fewest possible number of erroneous requests, thereby striking a better 
balance between copyright holders and end-users.   
The first step in addressing the problems inherent to the current notice-and-
takedown environment is to shift the public perception away from viewing robo-
takedown systems as categorically abusive.  It is unhelpful to look at an instance of 
an overly broad takedown request as conclusive evidence of the abusive nature of 
such practices as a categorical matter because it ignores the legitimate aim of 
takedown procedures to curb online piracy.  Instead, there must be a better way of 
describing the point at which a robo-takedown system actually veers so far away 
from its legitimate goal of combating digital piracy that it becomes an “abuse” of 
the § 512 notice-and-takedown provision.  Reframing the issue as such would help 
to both create more productive discussion of the issue but also to better hold 
copyright holders accountable when they do, in fact, take advantage of the 
procedure. 
 
 179. Order Denying Summary Judgment on Hotfile Counterclaim at 29, Disney Enters., Inc. v. 
Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (“Hotfile II”), https://
www.eff.org/document/order-denying-summary-judgment-hotfile-counterclaim-ecf-534. 
 180. See supra Part II.C. 
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The next step is to empower users to push back when their content has been the 
target of an erroneous robo-takedown request.  It is important both for individuals 
to understand their rights when their content is erroneously targeted by such 
requests and to have an efficient mechanism in place for users to push back against 
the removal of their content.  This is particularly true because, as long as robo-
takedown systems exist, there will remain the possibility that such processes will 
make mistakes and that overly broad requests will result.   
Lastly, in response to the “whack-a-mole” problem in particular, technologies 
should be developed to ensure that material that is affirmatively identified as 
infringing stays off the Internet.  This would help ensure that takedown requests 
actually target pirates and not innocent users, and could also mean that copyright 
holders are less tempted to employ automated processes in the first instance. 
A.  DRAWING A BETTER LINE BETWEEN “ABUSIVE” AND “NON-ABUSIVE” 
TAKEDOWN PRACTICES 
The first step in creating a more optimal notice-and-takedown environment is to 
better define the point at which robo-takedown regimes actually become abusive.  
This would benefit multiple parties:  users would have a better of sense of when 
they might have a cognizable claim, or might feel more empowered in employing 
the counter-notification mechanism; ISPs would get less bad publicity for 
employing automated processes generally, allowing them to focus on improving 
their takedown and counter-notification policies; and copyright holders would be 
incentivized to optimize their procedures so that they are as narrowly-tailored as 
possible to capture instances of piracy while limiting the takedown of noninfringing 
content. 
One extreme in drawing the line would be to say that robo-takedown practices 
are only abusive if the user can demonstrate that the copyright holder possessed 
subjective “bad faith” in issuing the request per Rossi.  In fact, some commentators 
already adopt a § 512(f)-based standard.181  But, this would be an incredibly 
difficult standard for a user to meet and would likely fail to address the chilling 
effect that takedown requests currently have on free speech.  On the other end of 
the extreme, robo-takedowns could be considered abusive once a robo-takedown 
request results in the removal of any noninfringing content.  Thus, even if a user 
could not succeed on a § 512(f) claim against the copyright holder by 
demonstrating bad faith, the request would still be considered abusive by resulting 
in the removal of noninfringing content.182  While this would be a much easier 
standard for the user to meet, it would place an unduly onerous burden on copyright 
holders—who face the undeniable problem of rampant piracy online, including the 
 
 181. COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 57. 
 182. “[C]opyright holders may send insufficient or vague notices, and even send notices on 
suspicion of diligent investigation, without triggering § 512(f).”  Urban & Quilter, supra note 104,  at 
629. 
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“whack-a-mole” problem—and ISPs—which are saddled with the responsibility of 
responding to an ever-increasing volume of takedown requests each day. 
Perhaps the best option would be a middle ground between the two extremes.  
For example, a copyright holder could be said to abuse the notice-and-takedown 
provision if she employs automated processes that result in the issuance of 
takedown requests for content having nothing to do with the copyrighted material 
in question.  Or, maybe abuse occurs where the requests frequently target content 
that traditionally fall under the category of “tolerated use”; for example, fan fiction 
websites or YouTube videos of people playing video games.183  At any rate, there 
are many potential ways the discourse surrounding automated takedown regimes 
can be better framed so that copyright holders and ISPs are incentivized to 
minimize the risk of erroneous takedown requests and so that, when noninfringing 
content is in fact targeted, users know when to push back with counter-notification 
or litigation. 
B.  STRENGTHENING THE COUNTER-NOTIFICATION SYSTEM WITH USER 
EDUCATION AND EMPOWERMENT 
Much literature has been devoted to ways in which automated takedown 
procedures necessarily result in the chilling of free speech and should, therefore, be 
disallowed or at least discouraged by the DMCA.  Many of these proposals, 
however, ignore the reality that robo-takedowns are perhaps a necessary feature in 
today’s notice-and-takedown environment.  Further, placing additional burdens on 
copyright holders and ISPs will make it easier for pirates to continue skirting the 
copyright laws and profiting off the creative content of others.  Instead of focusing 
on ways to disincentivize the use of automated takedown procedures in the first 
instance, attention should instead be focused on improving the counter-notification 
procedure so that, when noninfringing content is erroneously targeted, the counter-
notification procedure can become an effective tool for users to make sure their 
noninfringing content is protected.   
A legislative approach could involve making the jurisdictional consent 
requirement of § 512(g) symmetrical or taking it out entirely.  Currently, users 
wishing to serve counter-notifications under § 512(g) must submit to the court’s 
jurisdiction, but copyright holders submitting the initial takedown requests do 
not.184  Making this requirement symmetrical would at least place the same 
jurisdictional requirement on copyright holders as on users, creating an even 
 
 183. For a discussion of “tolerated use,” see Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 
(2008). 
 184. “[T]he DMCA provides explicitly that internet users . . . who wish to rebut a takedown notice 
must consent to the jurisdiction of a federal district court, but the statute does not require copyright 
owners who send takedown notices . . . to consent to personal jurisdiction.  That difference must be 
viewed as intentional.  If that result seems asymmetrical and unfair, then the problem should be resolved 
by Congress, not this court.”  Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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playing field and making copyright holders think twice before submitting takedown 
requests that could result in the removal of noninfringing content.  Currently, “the 
sending of a cease-and-desist letter into a forum is generally not considered 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the ‘effects test’ for purposeful 
availment in tort cases.”185  The circuits vary considerably as to whether sending a 
takedown notice will confer personal jurisdiction on a copyright holder.186  In fact, 
one case analyzed in the litigation research was dismissed because the defendant 
copyright holder had sent a takedown request from outside the United States and 
the court held that it therefore lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over 
the defendant.187  Simply requiring copyright holders to fill out a form similar to 
that required of users could make them think twice before sending frivolous 
takedown requests.  The jurisdiction requirement could also be taken out entirely, 
which would probably have the effect of making the counter-notification procedure 
seem less intimidating to the average user.  This could be problematic, however, in 
situations where pirates who are not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts follow 
the counter-notification procedure to prevent the removal of infringing material. 
A policy-based approach to strengthening the counter-notification procedure 
would be to improve public education on the procedure and how to use it.  ISPs, as 
well as Internet watchdogs like EFF and TorrentFreak, would be excellent and 
obvious fora for such information, but it would also benefit the copyright holders 
themselves to contribute to public education on the counter-notification procedure.  
As previously discussed, a lower incidence of erroneous takedowns would result in 
less bad press for copyright holders and would allow them to focus on optimizing 
automated takedown procedures. 
Step one toward improving user education would be to help users better identify 
when they might have a good argument that their content is noninfringing, i.e., 
when they might have a good basis for challenging a request to take their content 
down.  Part of this process could include providing information about the contours 
of copyright law generally so that users have a better sense of when their content 
may contain copyrighted material in the first instance.  This would not only help 
users better understand when their content may have been erroneously targeted by a 
takedown request, but could also help users know when the content they post 
online might actually be infringing someone’s valid copyright.  No vast discussion 
of copyright law would be required here to give users a better sense of when their 
content may contain copyrighted material; a simple checklist, for example, could 
suffice, as could a list of copyrighted material that is most often found in UGC 
content (e.g., a song created by someone other than the user).  Next, users should 
 
 185. Loren, supra note 16,  at 777. 
 186. See Envtl. Graphics, LLC v. Med. Murals, LLC, Civil No. 13-166 ADM/AJB, 2013 WL 
3338779, at *4 (D. Minn. July 2, 2013) (noting that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have found that an out-
of-forum takedown request or “other third-party enforcement action” is enough to confer personal 
jurisdiction, and that the Federal Circuit test, by contrast, requires that the third party be located in the 
forum). 
 187. See Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996. 
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be given a better sense of when they might have a good case for why their material 
is noninfringing.  For instance, users should be explicitly informed that content that 
has nothing to do with the copyrighted material in question is obviously 
noninfringing and that such a scenario would present a great case for pushback on a 
takedown request.  Also, content that obviously constitutes fair use could be 
identified—for example, parody videos.  Of course, the notoriously murky “gray 
areas” of the fair use doctrine would be more difficult to explain, and would be 
harder to implement as part of a large-scale education objective. 
The next step would be to educate the public on the how the counter-notification 
procedure works, what it entails, and what one’s likelihood of success is once it’s 
followed.  Key to this effort is educating the public on the markedly low incidence 
of litigation that ensues once the counter-notification procedure is actually 
followed.  The litigation analysis revealed only six cases of copyright infringement 
litigation arising after a user explicitly followed the counter-notification procedure 
(combining the results from categories one and three).  This suggests that when the 
user has a reason to contest takedown of her material, there is at least a chance that 
the copyright holder will choose not to sue.  Further, where a user successfully 
asserts a § 512(f) misrepresentation claim against a copyright holder, whether or 
not the user first followed the counter-notification procedure is something the court 
considers when determining the amount of damages to which the user is entitled.188  
Users should thus be encouraged to employ counter-notification when they think 
they might have a cognizable § 512(f) claim. 
A final step might be for ISPs to better inform the public on their individual 
counter-notification policies (many of them are already beginning to do this)—or, 
better yet, for ISPs to adopt a uniform, across-the-board counter-notification policy 
and procedure.  A uniform policy and procedure would result in less confusion for 
users and would make it more likely that users would actually follow the procedure 
where they have a good case of noninfringing use. 
C.  EMPLOYING TECHNOLOGY TO CREATE MORE COST-EFFICIENT “STAY 
DOWN” MECHANISMS 
A final suggestion for improving the current robo-takedown environment—one 
that might actually lessen the incentive for copyright holders and ISPs to employ 
automated takedown procedures in the first place—is to create more efficient 
mechanisms to ensure that material found to be infringing stays down.189  With the 
“whack-a-mole” problem addressed, copyright holders could rest assured that 
material determined to be infringing does not reappear moments after takedown in 
another location on the same site. 
Perhaps the best possible solution would be for ISPs to universally adopt a 
filtering approach by developing a screening process at the moment of upload that 
 
 188. See, e.g., Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 189. Hearing, supra note 99,  at 10 (statement of Sean M. O’Connor, Professor of Law). 
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blocks the re-upload of material previously determined to be infringing.190  This 
technique, referred to as “notice and stay-down,”191 would be technologically 
similar to some filtering systems that are already in place for all uploads on certain 
sites.  YouTube’s Content ID system is one example of technology that exists today 
that is able, in theory at least, to identify potentially infringing content at the 
moment of upload.192  To make the technology more precise, however, filtration for 
certain content could only occur once the ISP has identified infringing material and 
removed it pursuant to a takedown request.  While it is still possible that some 
material could be misidentified at the initial takedown stage, thus resulting in the 
blocking of noninfringing content, the user in that scenario would still be able to 
undergo the counter-notification procedure to get her content reinstated. 
The technology for this kind of filtering already exists and involves processes 
like watermarking or fingerprinting to properly identify content that has already 
been determined to be infringing.193  Further, filtration methods have already 
received support from a variety of companies and are currently employed to various 
degrees on numerous UGC sites.194 
CONCLUSION 
So, in the battle of robots versus pirates, who will prevail? 
The use of robo-takedown regimes is controversial, but perhaps that is because 
the effects of such regimes are not entirely understood, or because copyright 
holders and ISPs have not yet figured out a way to employ them effectively.  While 
there is clearly evidence of instances in which copyright holders employ overly 
broad or “abusive” takedown practices, there is also evidence to suggest that such 
practices can be turned into a force for good. 
Thus, the problem with the state of robo-takedowns today is twofold.  First, 
there is at least some evidence of overbroad takedown requests where robo-
takedowns result in the removal of noninfringing content.  This is particularly 
problematic in the digital world, where the preemptive removal of allegedly 
infringing content results in the chilling of free speech where the content turns out, 
in fact, to be noninfringing.  Second, the mechanisms available for users to push 
back on takedown requests targeting their content are not entirely viable.  Even 
though it is unclear what proportion of all takedown requests result in the removal 
of noninfringing material, when it does happen, users need a way to fight back. 
 
 190. “ISPs can at least in theory filter at the network level by screening all incoming network 
traffic to look for unique identifying marks, which could be assigned to each piece of digital content, to 
determine whether transmissions are authorized.”  COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 65. 
 191. Hearing, supra note 99,  at 14 (statement of Sean M. O’Connor, Professor of Law). 
 192. “YouTube’s Content ID digital fingerprinting system . . . allows right holders to submit 
metadata and reference files for content they own, which are compared to videos posted on YouTube.”  
COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 66. 
 193. COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 65. 
 194. COPYRIGHT GREEN PAPER, supra note 11, at 65–66. 
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It is therefore imperative that critics begin to at least consider the possibility that 
robo-takedown regimes might be the most efficient tool against piracy in the digital 
age, and that public discourse shift from a categorical dismissal of automated 
procedures toward more constructive efforts to improve them.  Defining the point 
at which a takedown regime actually becomes “abusive” is the first step in 
addressing this problem.  This will both help users know when they are likely to 
succeed in pushing back and will incentivize copyright holders and ISPs to 
optimize their procedures.  Once this is accomplished, a variety of other strategies 
can be employed to create a better notice-and-takedown environment for all parties.  
These suggestions include amending the DMCA, implementing policies of user 
education and empowerment, and harnessing the power of technology to make sure 
content that is found to be infringing stays down.  By turning robots into a force for 
good, it is possible to achieve the correct balance between the interests of copyright 
holders, ISPs, and users. 
 
